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1. SUMMARY: Whether New Mexico has concurrent jurisdiction 
to ~gulate hunting and fishing by nontribal members on resp's 
Indian reservation. 
2. FACTS & DECISION BELOW: Resp Tribe has adopted a 
comprehensive scheme of laws to regulate hunting and fishing on 
its reservation. These tribal ordinances were adopted pursuant 
to the tribal constitution and were duly approved by the 
cvs._e- - ~ wouQcL ~ ~ .h\; ~ <$G- ·~ fuN\- ' ~ 




Secretary of the Interior. The ordinances conflict with state 
game laws in several respects. Most importantly, the tribal 
I l ~· 
ordinances specifically allow nonmembers to hunt and fish on its 
reservation without a state license. Also, tribal hunting 
~seasons and bag limits do not correspond with those of the state. - The Tribe has erected a resort complex, and many nonmember 
sportsmen come to the reservation to hunt and fish. The revenue 
the Tribe garners from these sportsmen comprises a significant 
portion of the tribal budget. 
The Tribe has worked closely with the federal government to 
create and preserve wildlife resources. Several man-made lakes 
have been constructed with federal funds and are stocked from a 
national fish hatchery on the reservation. Moreover, with 
federal assistance, the Tribe has built up a substantial elk 
-----~ 
herd. The federal government also provides other forms of 
assistance to the Tribe. New Mexico has stipulated that tribal 
management of reservation wildlife resources has been exemplary, 
and in conformance with accepted wildlife management procedures. 
Although at one time New Mexico also provided the Tribe with 
considerable assistance, such as training of tribal conservation 
officers, and stocking of streams on the reservation, state 
involvement with the Tribe's wildlife program began to diminish 
in 1969, and is now virtually nonexistent. Although the state 
once enforced its wildlife laws and regulations on the 
reservation against nontribal members, the Tribe has now told the 
state that its fish and game officers are not welcome on the 
reservation without permission. 
( 
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The present controversy apparently erupted when the state 
threatened to arrest nonmembers for hunting on the reservation 
during one of the Tribe's big game seasons, which began prior to 
the state's season. Th~ribe filed suit in D. N. Mex. and 
~ecured a judgment declaring that the state may not apply its 
hunting and fishing laws to any person within the boundaries of 
the tribal reservation. The DC also enjoined the state from 
enforcing its game laws against any person either on the 
reservation or off the reservation for acts done on the 
reservation. 
~ 10 affirmed. Relying alternatively on federal preemption 
and tribal self-government grounds, see White Mountain Apache 
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 u.s. 136 (1980), CA 10 agreed that the 
~Tribe had the exclusive right to regulate hunting and fishing on 
----------------------its reservation. ~ 
With respect to preemption, CA 10 found that the applicable 
treaty and federal statutes, read against the backdrop of Indian 
sovereignty, ~eempted exercise of state power in this case. The 
court first noted the Tribe's inherent authority over wildlife 
management, which stems from its traditional reliance on wild 
game for basic survival needs. Furthermore, CA 10 saw a strong 
treaty and statutory basis for federal preemption. The court 
relied on: ( 1) the Apache Treaty, 10 Stat. 979 ( 18 52) , under 
which the Tribe submitted itself "exclusively" to the 
jurisdiction and government of the United States: (2) the New 
Mexico Enabling Act, 36 Stat. 557 (1910), in which New Mexico 
''· 
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Indian lands were placed "under the absolute jurisdiction and 
control" of the United States; 
(3) the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 35 u.s.c. §476, under 
which Congress provided that the adoption of a tribal 
constitution reconfirms in the tribe "all powers vested • by 
existing law"; (4) the tribal constitution, which gives the Tribe 
the power to "protect and preserve the property, wildlife and 
natural resources of the Tribe"; (5) the extensive federal 
participation in the Tribe's wildlife development program; and 
(6) the "negative inferences" from P.L. 280, 67 Stat. 590 (1953), 
which until 1968 allowed states the option of unilaterally 
asserting civil and criminal jurisdiction over certain Indian 
tribes. Even states that opted to assume jurisdiction could not 
deprive the tribes of "any right, privilege, or immunity afforded 
under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to 
hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or 
regulating thereof." 25 u.s.c. §132l(b). Since those states 
that opted to accept P.L. 280 jurisdiction were not permitted to 
hinder traditional hunting and fishing rights, the court felt 
that it followed~ fortiori that New Mexico, which declined to 
accept P.L. 280 jurisdiction, could not do so. 
Although recognizing that this Court appears to be gradually 
collapsing the preemption and tribal self-government tests into 
v?. one, CA 10 felt that the two tests continue to provide different 
analytical prospectives, and, accordingly, it analyzed separately 
the propriety of New Mexico's regulations with respect to their 
impact on tribal self-government. The court concluded that, even 
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if its federal preemption rationale were insufficient, the DC 
would in any event have to be affirmed under a tribal self-
government rationale. The court found a clear state interference 
with traditional tribal regulatory power. The Tribe made a 
showing that application of New Mexico's game laws would 
materially affect or frustrate the Indians' governance of 
themselves or any commercial, conservationist or other program 
administered by the Indians for their own advantage. Congress 
has declared that its policy is "to help develop and utilize 
Indian resources •.. to a point where the Indians will fully 
exercise responsibility for the utilization and management of 
their own resources." 25 u.s.c. §1451. CA 10 reasoned that if 
it were to permit state interference with the tribal regulatory 
scheme, it would be effectively denying Indians the opportunity 
of developing their own system. 
The state then filed for cert in this Court. We GVR'd for 
further consideration in light of Montana v. United States, 450 
u.s. 544 (1981). New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, No. 80-
778, 450 u.s. 1036 (1981). 
On remand, CA 10 reinstated its previous decision. Montana, 
----------------'---~~~--'----------reasoned the Court, dealt only with the right of an Indian tribe 
to regulate fishing and hunting by non-Indians on lands within 
its reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians. 450 U.S. at 
547. This case, in contrast, deals with the power of the Tribe J 
to control, exploit, and regulate trial resources on tribal land. ~~ 
CA 10 also noted this Court's recent decision in Merrion v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S.Ct. 894 (1982), in which the Court 
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held that, under the tribe's general sovereign authority to 
control economic activity within its jurisidiction, it could 
impose a severance tax on non-Indian mining activities on the 
tribe's reservation. Merrion convinced CA 10 that Montana does 
not dictate a result different from that originally reached by 
it. 
3. CONTENTIONS: First, New Mexico argues that CA 10 erred 
by dismissing Montana as irrelevant. The Montana Court stated 
that, as a "general proposition," the inherent sovereign powers 
of an Indian tribe "do not extend to activities of nonmembers of 
the Tribe." 450 U.S. at 565. Thus, the factual differences 
between Montana and this case are completely inconsequential. 
Moreover, contrary to CA lO's opinion, Merrion, not Montana, is 
irrelevant to the resolution of this case. Merrion involved only 
the question of tribal authority to impose a severance tax; it 
did not address whether the state would have concurrent taxing or 
regulatory authority. 
Second, New Mexico contends that CA lO's decision conflicts 
with a number of other cases that have held that a state has 
concurrent authority to regulate hunting and fishing by nontribal 
members on an Indian reservation. New Mexico cites White Earth 
Band of Chippewa Indians v. Alexander, 683 F.2d 1129 (CA 8 1982); 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274 (CA 9 
1981); United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162 (CA 9 1979), 
reversed on other grounds, 450 u.s. 544 (1981); United States v. 
Sanford, 547 F.2d 1085 (CA 9 1976); Montana ex. rel. Nepstad v. 
Danielson, 149 Mo. 438, 427 P.2d 689 (1967); and Ex Parte Crosby, 
-7-
38 Nev. 389, 149 P. 989 (1915). Contra, Eastern Band of Cherokee 
Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 588 F.2d 75 
(CA 4 1978), cert. dismissed, 446 u.s. 960 (1980). 
Third, New Mexico argues at length that CA 10 erred by 
finding preemption and infringement of tribal self-government 
under the facts of this case. 
Resp Tribe counters that CA 10 faithfully performed its duty 
on remand and correctly distinguished Montana. Second, without 
discussing the specific cases relied on by New Mexico as showing 
a conflict, the Tribe simply asserts that all cases cited by petr 
are distinguishable because the tribes in those cases did not do 
a good job of preparing an adequate factual foundation in support 
of their cases. Unlike those cases, the tribe here has a "sound 
factual foundation." Third, the Tribe argues that CA lO's 
decision is correct on the merits. 
An amici brief in support of the petition has been filed on 
behalf of eight western states with Indian reservations located 
within. Amici adopt the arguments of New Mexico, and assert that 
CA lO's decision, if allowed to stand, will have the potential of 
totally disrupting long-established game management programs, and 
could divest the states of their sovereign rights to regulate and 
control the harvesting of game by non-Indian sportsmen within 
their borders. The deer, elk, and other wildlife migrate back 
and forth across reservation boundaries. The Tribe incorrectly 
appears to view this wildlife as tantamount to Indian livestock. 
4. DISCUSSION: I believe that both Montana and Merrion are 
V\~ irrelevant to this case. Both of these cases dealt with the 
r~ . 
-8-
tribe's authority to regulate non-Indian conduct on its 
reservation. Here, the Tribe's regulatory authority is I 
The issue is whether the state has concurrent 
jurisdiction to regulate. 
undisputed. 
The critical Supreme Court decision in this regard is White 
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, supra, in which the Court held 
that Arizona was preempted from imposing certain taxes on a non-
Indian who was cutting timber on an Indian reservation. We 
stated that where "a State asserts authority over the conduct of 
non-Indians engaging in activities on the reservation," a court 
must make "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the State, 
Federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to 
determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state 
authority would violate federal law." Id. at 144-45. In finding 
preemption under the facts of Bracker, the Court gave particular 
weight to the following three factors: 
(1) the comprehensive and pervasive federal regulatory scheme for 
harvesting and marketing Indian timber left no room for 
additional state taxes or burdens~ (2) the assessment of state 
taxes would have obstructed federal policies relating to the 
profitability and management of Indian logging enterprises~ and 
(3) there was no regulatory function or service performed by the 
state that would justify the assessment of taxes, the general 
desire to raise revenue alone being an insufficient justification 
for taxation in light of the "significant geographical component 
to tribal sovereignty," a factor which, although not absolute, is 
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"important" and highly relevant in preemption analysis. Id. at 
145-50. 
Applying the Bracker factors to the present case, I think 
the outcome is close. The first Bracker factor is not present 
here: there is no "comprehensive and pervasive" federal 
regulatory scheme involved. It arguably could be said, however, 
that state regulation in the present context would obstruct 
federal policy favoring profitability and self-management of the 
Indian hunting and fishing enterprise, and it arguably can be 
said that the state is no longer performing regulatory functions 
or services on the reservation with respect to wildlife that 
would justify its assertion of jurisdiction over this matter. 
The present facts seem closer to those of Bracker than to those 
of Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), in 
which the Court upheld a state's assertion of concurrent taxing 
authority over cigarette sales to non-Indians on a reservation. 
New Mexico correctly points out that CA lO's decision 
conflicts with other cases that have upheld state authority to 
regulate hunting and fishing by nontribal members on an Indian 
reservation. In White Earth Band, supra, a post-Bracker 
decision, CA 8 held that Minnesota had concurrent jurisdiction to 
subject non-Indians hunting or fishing on tribal lands to 
licensing regulations. It is true that White Earth Band is 
perhaps factually distinguishable: CA 8 held simply that the 
Indians had not met their "burden of showing that the state's 
gaming laws were unreasonable and unrelated to its regulatory 
authority." 683 F.2d at 1138. 
-10-
CA lO's decision also conflicts with CA 9's pre-Bracker ------7 
opinions in United States v. Montana, supra, and United States v. 
Sanford, supra. However, White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 
supra, CA 9's most recent and only post-Bracker pronouncement on 
this subject, essentially is in accord with CA 10. While 
rejecting the argument that state regulation was barred on tribal 
self-government grounds, CA 9 intimated that state regulation 
might be preempted. In White Mountain, CA 9 consolidated two DC 
decisions, one of which had granted a preliminary injunction in 
favor of the Indians, and the other of which granted summary 
judgment against the Indians. Without deciding the merits of 
either case, CA 9 affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction 
in the former case, and vacated the summary judgment and remanded 
the latter case for further consideration in light of Bracker. 
The remaining cases cited by New Mexico are all pre-Bracker, 
as is Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife 
Resources Comm'n, supra, a CA 4 decision essentially in accord 
with CA 10. 
Although all of these cases are slightly different 
factually, the ~erlying legal issue seems sufficiently 
important and recurring to warrant a grant. The views of the SG 
should be most interesting and helpful. According to footnote 4 
of petr's brief, the Department of the Interior in 1971 issued a 
formal opinion advising that nontribal members could be subjected 
to state game laws on an Indian reservation. 78 I.D. 101 (1971). 
The opinion was withdrawn without explanation in 1976. 
I recommend CVSG, with a view towards a grant. 
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There is a response, and one amici brief. 
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New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, No. 82-331 
You indicated that annotation of the pool memo would be suffi-
cient in this case. I am in agreement with the memo writer and re-
main comfortable with my views expressed earlier. I vmuld affirm. 
The most relevant case for analytical purposes seems to be 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 u.s. 136 (lq80) (w/POW-
ELL, J.) 
State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in 
an activity on the reservation," what is called for is "a particu-
larized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal 
interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the 
specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate fed-
eral law." Id., at 144-145. The Court indicated that" [i]n such 
cases we have examined the language of the relevant federal treaties 
and statutes in terms of both the broad policies that underlie them 
and the notions of sovereignty that have developed from historical 
traditions of tribal independence." Id. 
I 
It is difficult to say that federal law will be violated di- ~~ 
rectly by concurrent state jurisdiction. The CAlO has identified, ,9oo; 
however, six sources of federal 
read with due consideration for 
~
reemption, which, I think, w~ 
tribal sovereignty, counsel s~fo~ 
for a conclusion that state authority is foreclosed. It seems clear 
to me that since the Treaty of July 1, 1852 that the United States 
' v 
has viewed the power to control hunting and fishing in the area in 
which the Apaches reside to be reserved. NM's enabling act would 
confirm this reservation, and the fact that Public Law 280, any 
2 • 
benefits of which NM has not elected to assume, specifically pro-
tects the tribes from the deprivation of "any right, privilege, or 
statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the con-
trol, licensing, or regulating thereof," 25 u.s.c. §132l(b}, makes 
it difficult for the State not to acknowledge federal preemption. 
Moreover, 18 u.s.c. §1165 provides for a criminal fine to be imposed 
on anyone hunting, fishing, or trapping on tribal trust land without 
tribal permission. 
Although the Tribal wildlife regulations are not a pure feneral ......._ 
regulatory scheme, I believe that they operate in a similar effect 
because of Congress' ability to preempt the Tribe's power. In any 
case, the Tribe's cons 
vasive." I am inclined to think that "no room remains for state 
laws imposing additional burdens," and that the superimposition of 
state regulation "could •.• disturb and disarrange" the federally ap-
proved plan. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380 
u.s. 6 8 5' 6 9 0 ' 6 91 ( 19 6 5} . 
At the moment, there is very little regulatory function or 
service performed on the Reservation by the State, and there is no 
------~---~ ----------------~'---------
. ~n~d justifying concurrent jurisdiction. Moreover, 
~~ .. hatever state interest there is seems relatively insignificant when 
~ compared with the interests of the Tribe in exploiting the resources 
that the reservation offers. I find interesting the SG's assertion -
that "absent special Congressional consent or clear necessity, we 
are not aware that this Court has ever condoned a State attempt to 
regulate the activities of non-Indians in their intercourse with a 
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From: Justice Marshall 
MAY 2 6 1983 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 82--331 
NEW MEXICO, ET AL., PETITIONER v. MESCALERO 
APACHE TRIBE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1983] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We are called upon to decide in this case whether a State 
may restrict an Indian Tribe's regulation of hunting and fish-
ing on its reservation. With extensive federal assistance 
and supervision, the Mescalero Apache Tribe has established 
a comprehensive scheme to regulate hunting and fishing 
within its reservation. Federally approved Tribal ordi-
nances regulate in detail the conditions under which both 
members of the Tribe and nonmembers may hunt and fish. 
New Mexico seeks to apply its own laws to hunting and fish-
ing by nonmembers on the reservation. We hold that this 
application of New Mexico's hunting and fishing laws is pre-
empted by the operation of federal law. 
I 
The Mescalero Apache Tribe (Tribe) resides on a reserva-
tion located within Otero County in south central New Mex-
ico. The reservation, which represents only a small portion 
of the aboriginal Mescalero domain, was created by a succes-
sion of Executive Orders promulgated in the 1870's and 
1880's. 1 The present reservation comprises more than 
1 See 1 C. Klapper, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 870--873 (1904). 









2 NEW MEXICO v. MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE 
460,000 acres, of which the Tribe owns all but 193.85 acres. 2 
Approximately 2,000 members of the Tribe reside on the res-
ervation, along with 179 non-Indians, including resident fed-
eral employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian 
Health Service. 
The Tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq., 
which authorizes any tribe residing on a reservation to adopt 
a constitution and bylaws, subject to the approval of the Sec-
retary of the Interior (Secretary). The Tribe's Constitution, 
which was approved by the Secretary on January 12, 1965, 
requires the Tribal Council 
"[t]o protect and preserve the property, wildlife and nat-
ural resources of the tribe, and to regulate the conduct of 
trade and the use and disposition of tribal property upon 
the reservation, providing that any ordinance directly af-
fecting non-members of the tribe shall be subject to re-
view by the Secretary of Interior." App. 53. 
The Constitution further provides that the Council shall 
"adopt and approve plans of operation to govern the con-
duct of any business or industry that will further the eco-
nomic well-being of the members of the tribe, and to un-
dertake any activity not inconsistent with Federal law or 
(Order of President Arthur). Portions of the reservation were briefly in-
cluded in a National Forest, but were restored to the Mescalero reserva-
tion by the Executive Order of Feb. 17, 1912 (Order of President Taft). 
An intervening Executive Order of Mar. 1, 1910, issued by President Taft 
exempted from the reservation two "small holdings claims" covering settle-
ments located before the establishment of the reservation. The Tribe has 
since purchased all but 23.8 acres of the land covered by these claims. 
2 These lands comprise the 23.8 acres remaining of the "small holdings 
claims," see note 1, supra; 10 acres granted to St. Joseph's Catholic Church 
by the Act of Mar. 29, 1928, ch. 299, 45 Stat. 1716; and the unimproved and 
unoccupied 160 acre "Dodson Tract" in the northwest portion of the res-
ervation. See Brief for United States 2 n. 3. 
82-331-0PINION 
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with this constitution, designed for the social or eco-
nomic improvement of the Mescalero Apache people, 
... subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior." 
Ibid. 
Anticipating a decline in the sale of lumber which has been 
the largest income-producing activity within the reservation, 
the Tribe has recently committed substantial time and re-
sources to the development of other sources of income. The 
Tribe has constructed a resort complex financed principally 
by federal funds, 8 and has undertaken a substantial develop-
ment of the reservation's hunting and fishing resources. 
These efforts provide employment opportunities for mem-
bers of the Tribe, and the sale of hunting and fishing licenses 
and related services generate)ncome which is used to main- - S 
tain the Tribal government and provide services to Tribe 
members. 4 
Development of the reservation's fish and wildlife re-
sources has involved a sustained, cooperative effort by the 
Tribe and the Federal Government. Indeed, the reserva-
tion's fishing resources are wholly attributable to these re-
cent efforts. Using federal funds, the Tribe has established 
3 Financing for the complex, the Inn of Mountain Gods, came principally 
from the Economic Development Administration (EDA), an agency of the 
United States Department of Commerce, and other federal sources. In 
addition, the Tribe obtained a $6 million loan from the Bank of New Mex-
ico, 90% of which was guaranteed by the Secretary of the Interior under 
the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. §§ 1451-1543, and 10% of 
which was guaranteed by Tribal funds. Certain additional facilities at the 
Inn were completely funded by the EDA as public works projects, and 
other facilities received 50% funding from the EDA. Appendix to Brief in 
Opposition 7a--8a. 
4 Income from the sale of hunting and fishing licenses, "package hunts" 
which combine hunting and fishing with use of the facilities at the Inn, and 
campground and picnicking permits totalled $269,140 in 1976 and $271,520 
in 1977. The vast majority of the nonmember hunters and fishermen on 
the reservation are not residents of the State of New Mexico. 
82-331-0PINION 
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eight artificial lakes which, together with the reservation's 
streams, are stocked by the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and 
Wildlife of the the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 
Deparment of the Interior, which operates a federal hatchery 
located on the reservation. None of the waters are stocked 
by the State.5 The United States has also contributed sub-
stantially to the creation of the reservation's game resources. 
Prior to 1966 there were only 13 elk in the vicinity of the res-
ervation. In 1966 and 1967 the National Park Service do-
nated a herd of 162 elk which was released on the reserva-
tion. Through its management and range development 6 the 
Tribe has dramatically increased the elk population, which by 
1977 numbered approximately 1,200. New Mexico has not 
contributed significantly to the development of the elk herd 
or the other game on the reservation, which includes ante-
lope, bear and deer. 7 
The Tribe and the Federal Government jointly conduct a 
comprehensive fish and game management program. Pur-
suant to its Constitution and to an agreement with the Bu-
reau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, 8 the Tribal Council 
adopts hunting and fishing ordinances each year. The tribal 
ordinances, which establish bag limits and seasons and pro-
vide for licensing of hunting and fishing, are subject to ap-
• The State has not stocked any waters on the reservation since 1976. 
6 These efforts have included controlling and reducing the population of 
other animals, such as wild horses and cattle, which compete for the avail-
able forage on the reservation. 
7 The New Mexico Department Game and Fish issued a permit for the 
importation of the~k from Wyoming into New Mexico. The Depart- ,_ 
ment has provided the Tribe with any management assistance which the 
Tribe has requested; such requests have been limited. Appendix to Brief 
in Opposition 16a. 
8 That agreement, which provides for the stocking of the reservation's 
artificallakes by the Bureau, obligates the Tribe to "designate those wa-
ters of the reservation which shall be open to public fishing" and "to estab-
lish regulations for the conservation of fishery resources." 
82-331-0PINION 
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proval by the Secretary under the Tribal Constitution and 
have been so approved. The Tribal Council adopts the game 
ordinances on the basis of recommendations submitted by a 
Bureau of Indian Affairs range conservationist who is as-
sisted by full-time conservation officers employed by the 
Tribe. The recommendations are made in light of the con-
servation needs of the reservation, which are detennined on 
the basis of annual game counts and surveys. Through the 
Bureau of Fish and Wildlife, the Secretary also detennines 
the stocking of the reservation's waters based upon periodic 
surveys of the reservation. 
Numerous conflicts exist between State and tribal hunting 
regulations. 9 For instance, tribal seasons and bag limits for 
both hunting and fishing often do not coincide with those im-
posed by the State. The Tribe pennits a hunter to kill both 
a buck and a doe; the State pennits only buck to be killed. 
Unlike the State, the Tribe pennits a person to purchase an 
elk license in two consecutive years. Moreover, since 1977, 
the Tribe's ordinances have specified that State hunting and 
fishing licenses are not required for Indians or non-Indians 
who hunt or fish on the reservation. 10 The New Mexico De-
partment of Game and Fish has enforced the State's regula-
tions by arresting non-Indian hunters for illegal possession of 
game killed on the reservation in accordance with tribal ordi-
nances but not in accordance with State hunting regulations. 
In 1977 the Tribe filed suit against the State and the Direc-
tor of its Fish and Game Department in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Mexico, seeking to pre-
vent the State from regulating on-reservation hunting or 
9 These conflicts have persisted despite the parties' stipulation that the 
New Mexico State Game Commission has attempted to "accomodate the 
preferences of the Mescalero Apache Tribe and other Indian tribes." Ap-
pendix to Brief in Opposition 25a. 
10 Prior to 1977 the Tribe consented to the application to the reservation 
of the State's hunting and fishing regulations. 
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fishing by members or nonmembers. On August 2, 1978, the 
District Court ruled in favor of the Tribe and granted de-
claratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the 
State's hunting and fishing laws against any person for hunt-
ing and fishing activities conducted on the reservation. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed. 630 F. 2d 724 (1980). Following New Mexico's pe-
tition for a writ of certiorari, this Court vacated the Tenth 
Circuit's judgment, 450 U. S. 1036 (1981), and remanded the 
case for reconsideration in light of Montana v. United States, 
450 U. S. 544 (1981). On remand, the Court of Appeals ad-
hered to its earlier decision. 677 F. 2d 55 (1982). We 
granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1982), and we now 
affirm. 
II 
New Mexico concedes that within the reservation the Tribe 
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over hunting and fishing by 
members of the Tribe and may also regulate the hunting and 
fishing by nonmembers. 11 New Mexico contends, however, 
that it may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over nonmem-
bers and that therefore its regulations governing hunting and 
fishing throughout the State should also apply to hunting and 
fishing by nonmembers on the reservation. Although New 
Mexico does not claim that it can require the Tribe to pennit 
nonmembers to hunt and fish on the reservation, it claims 
that, once the Tribe chooses to pennit hunting and fishing by 
nonmembers, such hunting and fishing is subject to any 
State-imposed conditions. Under this view the State would 
be free to impose conditions more restrictive than the Tribe's 
own regulations, including an outright prohibition. The 
question in this case is whether the State may so restrict the 
Tribe's exercise of its authority. 
Our decision in Montana v. United States, supra, does not 
resolve this question. Unlike this case, Montana concerned 
11 Brief for Petitioner 7, 12, 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. 
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lands located within the reservation but not owned by the 
Tribe or its members. We held that the Crow Tribe could 
not as a general matter regulate hunting and fishing on those 
lands. 450 U. S., at 557--567. 12 But as to "lands belonging 
to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the 
Tribe," we "readily agree[ d)" that a Tribe may "prohibit non-
members from hunting or fishing . . . [or] condition their en-
try by charging a fee or establish bag and creel limits." Id., 
at 557. We had no occasion to decide whether a Tribe may 
only exercise this authority in a manner permitted by a 
State. 
On numerous occasions this Court has considered the ques-
tion whether a State may assert authority over a reservation. 
The decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561 (1832), 
reflected the view that Indian tribes were wholly distinct na-
tions within whose boundaries "the laws of [a State] can have 
no force." We long ago departed from the "conceptual clar-
ity of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view in Worcester," Mes-
calero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148 (1973), and 
have acknowledged certain limitations on tribal sovereignty. 
For instance, we have held that Indian tribes have been im-
plicitly divested of their sovereignty in certain respects by 
virtue of their dependent status, 13 that under certain circum-
stances a State may validly assert authority over the activi-
12 Even so, the Court acknowledged that "Indian tribes retain inherent 
sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands." 450 U. S., at 
565. The Court stressed that in Montana the pleadings "did not allege 
that non-Indian hunting and fishing on [non-Indian] reservation lands [had] 
impaired [the Tribe's reserved hunting and fishing privileges]," id., at 558 
n.6, or "that non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee lands imperil the subsis- a..-
tence or welfare of the Tribe," id., at 566, and that the existing record ~ 
failed to suggested "that such non-Indian hunting and fishing ... threaten 
the Tribe's political or economic security," ibid. 
13 See, e. g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 
6?7--&>8 (1974); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191 (1978). 
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ties of nonmembers on a reservation, 14 and that in exceptional 
circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the on-
reservation activities of tribal members. 15 
Nevertheless, in demarcating the respective spheres of 
State and tribal authority over Indian reservations, we have 
continued to stress that "Indian tribes are unique aggrega-
tions possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their 
members and their territory," White Mountain Apache Tribe 
v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 142 (1980), quoting United States 
v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975). Because of their sov-
ereign status, tribes and their reservation lands are insulated 
by an "historic immunity from state and local control," M es-
calero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 152 (1973), and 
tribes retain any aspect of their historical sovereignty not 
"inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National 
Government." Washington v. Confederated Tribes, supra, 
at 153. 
The sovereignty retained by tribes includes "the power of 
regulating their internal and social relations," United States 
v. Kagama, 118 U. &. 375, 381--382 (1886), cited in United 
States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 322 (1978). A tribe's 
power to presribe the conduct of tribal members has never 
been doubted, and our cases establish that a State may not 
assert its authority over the activities of members on a res-
14 See, e. g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); 
Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976). 
16 See Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 433 U.S. 165 (1977). 
Puyallup upheld the State of Washington's authority to regulate on-res-
ervation fishing by tribal members. Like Montana v. United States, 
supra, the decision in Puyallup rested in part on the fact that the dispute 
centered on lands which, although located within the reservation bound-
aries, no longer belonged to the tribe; all but 22 of the 18,000 acres had 
been alienated in fee simple. The Court also relied on a provision of the 
Indian treaty which qualified the Indians' fishing rights by requiring that 
they be exercised "in common with all citizens of the Territory," id., 175, 
and on the State's interest in conserving a scarce, common resource. 
Id., at 174, 175-177. 
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ervation in the absence of express tribal consent or congres-
sional grant. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382, 
388-389 (1976)(per curiam); McClanahan v. Arizona Stae 
Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 171 (1973); Mescalero Apache 
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148 (1973). See also Williams 
v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 222 (1959). 
A tribe's power to exclude nonmembers entirely or to con-
dition their presence on the reservation is equally well estab-
lished. See, e. g., Montana v. United States, supra; 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130 (1982). 
Whether a State may also assert its authority over the on-
reservation activities of nonmembers raises "[m]ore difficult 
questions," Bracker, supra, at 144. While under some cir-
cumstances a State may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over 
non-Indians acting on tribal reservations, see, e. g., Wash-
ington v. Confederated Tribes, supra; Moe v. Salish & Koote-
nai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976), such authority may be as-
serted only if not preempted by the operation of federal law. 
See, e. g., Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra; White Moun-
tain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, supra; Central Machinery Co. 
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U. S. 160 (1980); Williams v. 
Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ari-
zona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965); Fisher v. District 
Court, supra; Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 
u. s. 423 (1971). 
In Bracker we reviewed our prior decisions concerning 
tribal and State authority over Indian reservations and ex-
tracted certain principles governing the determination 
whether federal law preempts the assertion of State author-
ity over nonmembers on a reservation. We stated that that 
determination does not depend "on mechanical or absolute 
conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but calls for a par-
ticularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and 
tribal interests at stake." 448 U. S., at 145. 
We also emphasized the special sense in which the doctrine 
of preemption is applied in this context. See id., at 143-144; 
Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra,-- U. S., at--. AI-
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though a State will certainly be without jurisdiction if its au-
thority is preempted under familiar principles of preemption, 
we cautioned that our prior cases did not limit pre/emption of 
State laws affecting Indian tribes to only those circum-
stances. "The unique historical origins of tribal sover-
eignty" and the federal commitment to tribal self-sufficiency 
and self-determination make it "treacherous to import . . . 
.9 notions of prejemption that are properly applied to other con-
texts." Bracker, supra, at 143. See also Ramah Navajo 
School Bd., supra, at --. By resting preemption analysis 
principally on a consideration of the nature of the competing 
interests at stake, our cases have rejected a narrow focus on 
congressional intent to preempt State law as the sole touch-
stone. They have also rejected the proposition that preemp-
tion requires "an express congressional statement to that ef-
fect." Bracker, supra, at 144 (footnote omitted). State 
jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it 
interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests 
reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake 
are sufficient to justify the assertion of State authority. 
Bracker, supra, at 145. See also Ramah Navajo School 
Bd., supra, at-, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 
52, 67 (1941). 16 
Certain broad considerations guide our assessment of the 
federal and tribal interests. The traditional notions of In-
dian sovereignty provide a crucial "backdrop," Bracker, 
supra, at 143, citing McClanahan, supra, at 172, against 
which any assertion of State authority must be assessed. 
16 The exercise of State authority may also be barred by an independent 
barrier-inherent tribal sovereignty-if it "unlawfully infringe[s] 'on the 
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S., at 142, quoting Wil-
liams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959). See also Washington v. Yakima 
Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 502 (1979); Fisher v. District Court, 424 
U. S. 382 (1976) (per curiam); Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 
U. S. 423 (1971)." 448 U. S., at 142-143. 
e-
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Moreover, both the tribes and the Federal Government are 
firmly committed to the goal of promoting tribal self-govern-
ment, a goal embodied in numerous federal statutes. 17 We 
have stressed that Congress' objective of furthering tribal 
self-government encompasses far more than encouraging 
tribal management of disputes between members, but in-
cludes Congress' overriding goal of encouraging tribes "to as-
sume control over their 'business and economic affairs,'" 
Bracker, supra, at 149, citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. 
Jones, 411 U. S., at 151. In part as a necessary implication 
of this broad federal commitment, we have held that tribes 
have the power to manage the use of its territory and re-
sources by both members and nonmembers, 18 Merrion, 
supra, at 137; Bracker, supra, at 151; Montana v. United 
17 For example, the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et 
seq., states: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress ... to help 
develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and human, to a point 
where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the utilization and 
management of their own resources and where they will enjoy a standard 
of living from their own productive efforts comparable to that enjoyed by 
non-Indians in neighboring communities." § 1451. Similar policies under-
lie the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 
U. S. C. § 450 et seq., as well as the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 
U. S. C. § 461 et seq., pursuant to which the Mescalero Apache Tribe 
adopted its Constitution. The "intent and purpose of the Reorganization 
Act was 'to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to give him a chance 
to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternal-
ism.'" Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S., at 152, quoting H. R. 
Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934). The Indian Civil Rights Act 
of 1968, 25 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq., likewise reflects Congress' intent "to 
promote the well-established federal 'policy of furthering Indian self-gov-
ernment.'" Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 62 (1978), 
quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974). 
18 Our cases have recognized that tribal sovereignty contains a "signifi-
cant geographical component." Bracker, supra, at 151. Thus the off-res-
ervation activities of Indians are generally subject to the prescriptions of a 
"nondiscriminatory state law" in the absence of "express federal law to the 
contrary.'' Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S., at 148-149. 
82-331-0PINION 
12 NEW MEXICO v. MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE 
States, supra; 28 U. S. C. § 1162(b); 25 U. S. C. §§ 1321(b), 
1322(b); 18 U. S. C. § 1165, to undertake and regulate eco-
nomic activity within the reservation, Merrion, supra, at 
137, and to defray the cost of governmental services by levy-
ing taxes. Ibid. Thus, when a tribe undertakes an enter-
prise under the authority of federal law, an assertion of State 
authority is preempted to the extent that it "threaten[s] the 
overriding federal objective" of promoting "tribal self-suffi-
ciency and economic development." Bracker, supra, at 149, 
143 (footnote omitted). See also Ramah Navajo School Bd., 
supra, at--, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 
(1941) (State authority precluded when it "stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress"). 
Our prior decisions also guides our assessment of the state 
interest asserted to justify State jurisdiction over a reserva-
tion. The exercise of State authority which imposes addi-
tional burdens on a tribal enterprise must ordinarily be justi-
fied by functions or services performed by the State in 
connection with the on-reservation activity. Ramah Navajo 
School Bd., supra, at -- & note 7; Bracker, supra, at 
148-149; Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 
448 U. S. 160, 174 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring). Thus a 
State seeking to impose a tax on a transaction between a 
Tribe and nonmembers must point to more than its general 
interest in raising revenues. See, e. g., Warren Trading 
Post Co., supra; Bracker, supra; Ramah Navajo School Bd., 
supra. A State seeking not merely to tax but to regulate a 
tribal activity is under a greater burden to advance a signifi-
cant State interest, since duplicative and potentially conflict-
ing regulation is generally more disruptive than double tax-
ation. Cf. Confederated Tribes, supra, at 159. A State's 
regulatory interest will be particularly substantial if the 
State can point to off-reservation effects that necessitate 
State intervention. Cf. Puyallup Tribe v. Washington 
Game Dept., supra. 
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III 
With these principles in mind, we turn to New Mexico's 
claim that it may superimpose its own hunting and fishing 
regulations on the Mescalero Apache Tribe's regulatory 
scheme. 
A 
It is beyond doubt that the Mescalero Apache Tribe law-
fully exercises substantial control over the lands and re-
sources of its reservation, including its wildlife. As noted 
above, supra, at k!l-, and as conceded by New Mexico, 19 the 
sovereignty retained by the Tribe under the Treaty of 1852 
includes its right to regulate the use of its resources by mem-
bers as well as non-members. In Montana v. United States, 
supra, we specifically recognized that tribes in general retain 
this authority. 
Moreover, this aspect of tribal sovereignty has been ex-
pressly confirmed by numerous federal statutes. 20 Pub. L. 
280 specifically confirms the power of tribes to regulate on-
reservation hunting and fishing. 67 Stat. 588, 25 U. S. C. 
§ 1321(b); 18 U. S. C. § 1162(b). 21 This authority is afforded 
e 19 New Mexico concedes that the Tribe originally relied on wildlife for 
~nee, that tribal members freely took fish and game in ancestral ter- V 
ritory, and that the Treaty of July 1, 1852, 10 Stat. 979, between the Tribe 
and the United States confirmed the Tribe's rights regarding hunting and 
fishing on the small portion of the aboriginal Mescalero domain that was 
eventually set apart as the Tribe's reservation. Brief, at 12. See Me-
nominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U. S. 404 (1968); Montana 
v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, 558-559 (1981). See also United States v. 
Winans, 198 U. S. 371, 381 (1905)(recognizing that hunting and fishing 
"were not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the at-
mosphere they breathed"). 
20 The Tribe's authority was also confirmed more generally by the Indian 
Reorganization Act, 25 U.S. C. §476, which reaffirms "all powers vested 
in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law." 
21 The provision of Pub. L. 280 granting States criminal jurisdiction over 
Indian reservations under certain conditions provides that States were not 
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the protection of the federal criminal law by 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1165, which makes it a violation of federal law to enter In-
dian land to hunt, trap or fish without the consent of the 
tribe. See Montana v. United States, 450 U. S., at 562 n. · 
11. The 1981 amendments to the Lacey Act, 16 U. S. C. 
§ 3371 et seq., further accord tribal hunting and fishing regu-
lations the force of federal law by making it a federal offense 
to violate "any Indian tribal law." § 3iZ_2(a)(~). 22 3 
B 
Several considerations strongly support the Court of Ap-
peals' conclusion that the Tribe's authority to regulate hunt-
ing and fishing preempts State jurisdiction. It is important 
to emphasize that concurrent jurisdiction would effectively 
nullify the Tribe's authority to control hunting and fishing on 
the reservation. Concurrent jurisdiction would empower 
New Mexico wholly to supplant tribal regulations. The 
State would be able to dictate the terms on which nonmem-
bers are permitted to utilize the reservation's resources. 
The Tribe would thus exercise its authority over the reserva-
tion only at the sufferance of the State. The tribal authority 
to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers, which has 
been repeatedly confirmed by federal treaties and laws and 
which we explicitly recognized in montana v. United States, 
supra, would have a rather hollow ring if tribal authority 
amounted to no more than this. 
Furthermore, the exercise of concurrent State jurisdiction 
in this case would completely "disturb and disarrange", War-
"deprive any Indian of any Indian trie, band, or community of any right, 
privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or stat-
ute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control , licensing or 
regulation thereof." 18 U. S. C. § 1162(b); 25 U. S. C. § 1321(b) (emphasis 
added). 
22 Sections 3375(a) and (b) authorize the Secretary to enter into agree-
ments with Indian tribes to enforce the provisions of the law by, inter alia, 
making arrests and serving process. 
v 
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ren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 
685, 691 (1965), the comprehensive scheme of federal and 
tribal management established pursuant to federal law. As 
described above, ~' at .J.::L, federal law requires the Sec- ~ ) 
retary to review each of the Tribe's hunting and fishing ordi-
nances. Those ordinances are based on the recommenda-
tions made by a federal range conservationist employed by 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Moreover, the Bureau of 
Sport Fisheries an.d Wildlife stocks the reservation's waters 
based on its own determinations concerning the availability of 
fish, biological requirements, and the fishing pressure cre-
ated by on-reservation fishing. App. 71. 23 
Concurrent State jurisdiction would supplant this regula-
tory scheme with an inconsistent dual system: members 
would be governed by Tribal ordinances, while nonmembers 
would be regulated by general State hunting and fishing 
laws. This could severely hinder the ability of the Tribe to 
conduct a sound management program. Tribal ordinances 
reflect the specific needs of the reservation by establishi_~~ 
the optimal level of hunting and fishing that should occuzr, 
not simply a maximum level that should not be exceeded. 
State laws in contrast are based on considerations not neces-
sarily relevant to, and possibly hostile to, the needs of the 
reservation. For instance, the ordinance permitting a 
hunter to kill a buck and a doe was designed to curb excessive 
growth of the deer population on the reservation. App. at 
153-154. Enforcement of the State regulation permitting 
only buck to be killed would frustrate that objective. Simi-
larly, by determining the Tribal hunting seasons, bag limits, 
and permit availability, the Tribe regulates the duration and 
intensity of hunting. These determinations take into ac-
count numerous factors, including the game capacity of the 
terrain, the range utilization of the game animals, and the 
28 In addition, as noted earlier, supra, at 3::¥, the Federal Government 
played a substantial role in the development of the Tribe's resources. 
82-331-0PINION 
16 NEW MEXICO v. MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE 
availability of tribal personnel to monitor the hunts. Permit-
ting the State to enforce different restrictions simply because 
they have been determined to be appropriate for the State as 
a whole would impose on the Tribe the possibly insurmount-
able task of ensuring that the patchwork application of State 
and Tribal regulations remains consistent with sound man-
agement of the reservation's resources. 
Federal law commits to the Secretary and the Tribal Coun-
cil the responsibility to manage the reservation's resources. 
It is most unlikely that Congress would have authorized, and 
the Secretary would have established, financed, and partici-
pated in Tribal management if it were thought that New 
Mexico was free to nullify the entire arrangement. 24 Requir-
ing Tribal ordinances to yield whenever State law is more re-
strictive would seriously "undermine the Secretary's [and the 
Tribe's] ability to make the wide range of determinations 
committed to [their] authority." Bracker, supra, at 149. 
See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382, 390 (1976)(per 
curiam); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544 (1975). 25 
24 The Secretary assumed precisely the opposite is true-that State ju-
risdiction is preempted-when he approved a tribal ordinance which pro-
vided that nonmembers hunting and fishing on the reservation need not ob-
tain State licenses. That assumption is also embodied in an agreement 
between the Tribe and the Department of Interior's Bureau of Sport Fish-
eries and Wildlife, see note 7, supra, which openly acknowledges that 
tribal regulations need not agree with State laws. The agreement pro-
vides that "[i]nsofar as possible said regulations shall be in agreement 
with State regulations." (Emphasis added). 
26 Congress' intent to preempt State regulation of hunting and fishing on 
reservations is reinforced by Pub. L. 280. That law, which grants limited 
criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians reservations to States which 
meet certain requirements, contains a provision which expressly excludes 
authority over hunting and fishing. That provision provides that a State 
which has properly assumed jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280 is not thereby 
authorized to 
"deprive any Indian of any Indian trie, band, or community of any right, 
privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or stat-
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The assertion of concurrent jurisdiction by New Mexico not 
only would threaten to disrupt the federal and tribal regula-
tory scheme, bu~also_ threaten Congress' overriding objec- w o u I J 
tive of encouraging tribal self-government and economic 
development. The Tribe has engaged in a concerted and 
sustained undertaking to develop and manage the reserva-
tion's wildlife and land resources specifically for the benefit of 
its members. The project generates funds for essential 
tribal services and provides employment for members who 
reside on the reservation. This case is thus far removed 
from those situations, such as on-reservation sales outlets 
which market to nonmembers goods not manufactured by the 
tribe or its members, in which the tribal contribution to an 
enterprise is de minimis. See Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes, 447 U. S. 134, 154-159 (1980). 26 The Tribal enter-
prise in this case clearly involves "value generated on the res-
ervation by activities involving the Trib[e]." ld., at 
156-157. The disruptive effect that would result from the 
ute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing or 
regulation thereof." 18 U. S. C. § 1162(b); 25 U. S. C. § 1321(b) (emphasis 
added). 
Pub. L. 280 evidences Congress' understanding that tribal regulation of 
hunting and fishing should generally be insulated from State interference, 
since "Congress would not have jealously protected" tribal exemption from 
conflicting State hunting and fishing laws "had it thought that the States 
had residual power to impose such [laws] in any event." McClanahan v. 
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 177 (1973). In McClanahan we con-
cluded that the Buck Act, 4 U. S. C. § 105 et seq., which contains a provi-
sion exempting Indians from a grant to the States of general authority to 
tax residents of federal areas, likewise provided evidence of Congress' in-
tent to exempt Indians from State taxes. Ibid. 
26 In Washington v. Confederated Tribes the Court held that the sales of 
tribal smokeshops which sold cigarettes to nonmembers were subject to 
the State sales and cigarette taxes. !d., at 154-159. The Court relied on 
the fact that the tribal smokeshops were not marketing "value generated 
on the reservation," id., at 156-157, but instead were seeking merely to 
market a "tax exemption to nonmembers who do not receive significant 
tribal services." Id., at 157. 
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assertion of concurrent jurisdiction by New Mexico would 
plainly "stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress," Ramah Navajo 
School Bd., supra, at--, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
u. s. 52, 67 (1941). 
c 
The State has failed to "identify any regulatory function or 
service . . . that would justify" the assertion of concurrent 
regulatory authority. Bracker, supra, at 148. The hunting 
and fishing permitted by the Tribe occurs entirely on the res-
ervation. The fish and wildlife resources are either native to 
the reservation or were created by the joint efforts of the 
Tribe and the Federal Government. New Mexico does not 
contribute in any significant respect to the maintenance of 
these resources, and can point to no other "governmental 
functions it provides," Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at 
--, in connection with hunting and fishing on the reserva-
tion by nonmembers that would justify the assertion of its 
authority. 
The State also cannot point to any off-reservation effects 
that warrant State intervention. Some species of game 
never leave tribal lands, and the State points to no specific 
interest concerning those that occasionally do. Unlike 
Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., supra, this is 
not a case in which a Treaty expressly subjects a tribe's hunt-
ing and fishing rights to the common rights of nonmembers 
and in which a State's interest in conserving a scarce, com-
mon supply justifies State intervention. 433 U. S., at 17 4, 
175-177. The State concedes that the Tribe's management 
has not had an adverse impact on fish and wildlife outside the 
reservation." Respondent's Brief in Opposition, App. 35a. ?:1 
-n we rejct the State's claim that the Tribe's ability to manage its wildlife 
resources suffers from a lack of enforcement powers and that therefore 
concurrent jurisdiction is necessary to fill the void. The Tribe clearly can 
exclude or expel those who violate Tribal ordinances. Trespassers may be 
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New Mexico contends that it will be deprived of the sale of 
state licenses to nonmembers who hunt and fish on the res-
ervation, as well as some federal matching funds calculated in 
part on the basis of the number of State licenses sold. 28 
However, the State expressly disavows any reliance on its 
taxing powers as the basis for concurrent jurisdiction. It de-
fends the application of its hunting and fishing laws, including 
the State's license requirement, solely as a proper exercise of 
its regulatory authority, Petitioner's Brief 18 n. 5, and the 
State's regulatory interests, as we have indicated, are insig-
nificant. Even if the State's licensing requirement were 
properly characterized and defended as an independent tax-
ing measure, the State's financial interests are insufficient to 
justify the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction. The loss of 
revenues to the State is likely to be insubstantial given the 
small numbers of persons who purchase tribal hunting li-
censes.29 Moreover, as already noted, supra, at LL-,the v 
State has pointed to no services it has performed in connec-
tion with hunting and fishing by nonmembers which justify 
imposing a tax in the form of a hunting and fishing license, 
Ramaha Navajo School Bd., supra, at--; Central Ma-
chinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U. S., at 174 (Pow-
referred for prosecution under 18 U. S. C. § 1165. Furthermore, the 
Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U. S. C. § 3371 et seq., make it a fed-
eral offense to violate any tribal law, provide for civil and criminal penalties 
and authorizes forfeiture of fish or wildlife as well as vehicles or equipment 
used in the violation, §§ 3373, 3374, and provide that the Secretary can 
grant authority to tribal personnel to enforce these provisions. § 3375(a), 
(b). 
28 The State receives federal matching funds through the Pittman-Robin-
son Act, 16 U. S. C. 669 (hunting), and the Dingle-Johnson Act, 16 
U. S. C. 777 (fishing), which are allocated through a formula which consid-
ers the number of licenses sold and the number of acres in the State. 
29 In recent years the Tribe sold 10 antelope licenses compared to 3,500 
for the State, 50 elk licenses compared to 14,000 by the State, and 500 deer 
licenses compared to 100,000 for the State. 
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ELL, J., concurring), and its general desire to avoid a loss of 
revenues is simply inadequate to justify the assertion of con-
current jurisdiction in this case. See Bracker, 448 U. S., at 
150; Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at --.30 
IV 
In this case the governing body of an Indian Tribe, work-
ing closely with the Federal Government and under the au-
thority of federal law, has exercised its lawful authority to 
develop and manage the reservation's resources for the bene-
fit of its members. The exercise of concurrent Jurisdiction 
by the State would effectively nullify the Tribe's unques-
tioned authority to regulate the use of its resources by mem-
bers and nonmembers, interfere with the comprehensive 
tribal regulatory scheme, and threaten Congress' firm com-
mitment to the encouragement of tribal self-sufficiency and 
economic development. Given the strong interests favoring 
exclusive tribal jurisdiction and the absence of State interests 
which justify the assertion of concurrent authority, we con-
clude that the application of the State's hunting and fishing 
laws to the reservation is preempted. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
30 New Mexico concedes that it has expended no Dingle-Johnson funds 
for projects within the reservation during the last six to eight years. Brf. 
in Op. App. 17a-18a. It presented no evidence as to expenditures of 
Pittman-Robinson funds within the reservation. 
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From: Justice Marshall 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: _1'_A_~_3_1_1_98_3 __ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-331 
NEW MEXICO, ET AL., PETITIONER v. 
MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
[June -, 1983] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, delivered j,he opinion of the Court. 
We are called upon to decide in this case whether a State 
may restrict an Indian Tribe's regulation of hunting and fish-
ing on its reservation. With extensive federal assistance 
and supervision, the Mescalero Apache Tribe has established 
a comprehensive scheme for managing the reservation's fish 
and wildlife resources. Federally approved Tribal ordi-
nances regulate in detail the conditions under which both 
members of the Tribe and nonmembers may hunt and fish. 
New Mexico seeks to apply its own laws to hunting and fish-
ing by nonmembers on the reservation. We hold that this 
application of New Mexico's hunting and fishing laws is pre-
empted by the operation of federal law. 
I 
The Mescalero Apache Tribe (Tribe) resides on a reser-
vation located within Otero County in south central New 
Mexico. The reservation, which represents only a small por-
tion of the aboriginal Mescalero domain, was created by a 
succession of Executive Orders promulgated in the 1870's and 
1880's. 1 The present reservation comprises more than 
' See 1 C. Klapper, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 870-873 (1904). 
The final boundaries were fixed by the Executive Order of Mar. 24, 1883 
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460,000 acres, of which the Tribe owns all but 193.85 acres. 2 
Approximately 2,000 members of the Tribe reside on the res-
ervation, along with 179 non-Indians, including resident fed-
eral employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian 
Health Service. 
The Tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. §461 et seq., 
which authorizes any tribe residing on a reservation to adopt 
a constitution and bylaws, subject to the approval of the Sec-
retary of the Interior (Secretary). The Tribe's Constitution, 
which was approved by the Secretary on January 12, 1965, 
requires the Tribal Council 
"[t]o protect and preserve the property, wildlife and nat-
ural resources of the tribe, and to regulate the conduct of 
trade and the use and disposition of tribal property upon 
the reservation, providing that any ordinance directly af-
fecting non-members of the tribe shall be subject to re-
view by the Secretary of Interior." App. 53. 
The Constitution further provides that the Council shall 
"adopt and approve plans of operation to govern the con-
duct of any business or industry that will further the eco-
nomic well-being of the members of the tribe, and to un-
dertake any activity not inconsistent with Federal law or 
(Order of President Arthur). Portions of the reservation were briefly in-
cluded in a National Forest, but were restored to the Mescalero reserva-
tion by the Executive Order of Feb. 17, 1912 (Order of President Taft). 
An intervening Executive Order of Mar. 1, 1910, issued by President Taft 
exempted from the reservation two "small holdings claims" covering settle-
ments located before the establishment of the reservation. The Tribe has 
since purchased all but 23.8 acres of the land covered by these claims. 
2 These lands comprise the 23.8 acres remaining of the "small holdings 
claims," see note 1, supra; 10 acres granted to St. Joseph's Catholic Church 
by the Act of Mar. 29, 1928, ch. 299, 45 Stat. 1716; and the unimproved and 
unoccupied 160 acre "Dodson Tract" in the northwest portion of the res-
ervation. See Brief for United States 2 ri. 3: 
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with this constitution, designed for the social or eco-
nomic improvement of the Mescalero Apache people, 
... subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior." 
Ibid. 
Anticipating a decline in the sale of lumber which has been 
the largest income-producing activity within the reservation, 
the Tribe has recently committed substantial time and re-
sources to the development of other sources of income. The 
Tribe has constructed a resort complex financed principally 
by federal funds, 3 and has undertaken a substantial develop-
ment of the reservation's hunting and fishing resources. 
These efforts provide employment opportunities for mem-
bers of the Tribe, and the sale of hunting and fishing licenses 
and related services generates income which is used to main-
tain the Tribal government and provide services to Tribe 
members. 4 
Development of the reservation's fish and wildlife re-
sources has involved a sustained, cooperative effort by the 
Tribe and the Federal Government. Indeed, the reserva-
tion's fishing resources are wholly attributable to these re-
cent efforts. Using federal funds, the Tribe has established 
3 Financing for the complex, the Inn of Mountain Gods, came principally 
from the Economic Development Administration (EDA), an agency of the 
United States Department of Commerce, and other federal sources. In 
addition, the Tribe obtained a $6 million loan from the Bank of New Mex-
ico, 90% of which was guaranteed by the Secretary of the Interior under 
the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. §§ 1451-1543, and 10% of 
which was guaranteed by Tribal funds. Certain additional facilities at the 
Inn were completely funded by the EDA as public works projects, and 
other facilities received 50% funding from the EDA. Appendix to Brief in 
Opposition 7a-8a. 
' Income from the sale of hunting and fishing licenses, "package hunts" 
which combine hunting and fishing with use of the facilities at the Inn, and 
campground and picnicking permits totalled $269,140 in 1976 and $271,520 
in 1977. The vast majority of the nonmember hunters and fishermen on 
the reservation are not residents of the State of New Mexico. 
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eight artificial lakes which, together with the reservation's 
streams, are stocked by the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and 
Wildlife of the the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Depart-
ment of the Interior, which operates a federal hatchery lo-
cated on the reservation. None of the waters are stocked by 
the State. 6 The United States has also contributed substan-
tially to the creation of the reservation's game resources. 
Prior to 1966 there were only 13 elk in the vicinity of the res-
ervation. In 1966 and 1967 the National Park Service do-
nated a herd of 162 elk which was released on the reserva-
tion. Through its management and range development 6 the 
Tribe has dramatically increased the elk population, which by 
1977 numbered approximately 1,200. New Mexico has not 
contributed significantly to the development of the elk herd 
or the other game on the reservation, which includes ante-
lope, bear and deer. 7 
The Tribe and the Federal Government jointly conduct a 
comprehensive fish and game management program. Pur-
suant to its Constitution and to an agreement with the Bu-
reau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, 8 the Tribal Council 
adopts hunting and fishing ordinances each year. The tribal 
ordinances, which establish bag limits and seasons and pro-
vide for licensing of hunting and fishing, are subject to ap-
5 The State has not stocked any waters on the reservation since 1976. 
6 These efforts have included controlling and reducing the population of 
other animals, such as wild horses and cattle, which compete for the avail-
able forage on the reservation. 
' The New Mexico Department Game and Fish issued a permit for the 
importation of the elk from Wyoming into New Mexico. The Department 
has provided the Tribe with any management assistance which the Tribe 
has requested; such requests have been limited. Appendix to Brief in Op-
position 16a. 
8 That agreement, which provides for the stocking of the reservation's 
artifical lakes by the Bureau, obligates the Tribe to "designate those wa-
ters of the reservation which shall be open to public fishing" and "to estab-
lish regulations for the conservation of fishery resources." App. 71. 
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proval by the Secretary under the Tribal Constitution and 
have been so approved. The Tribal Council adopts the game 
ordinances on the basis of recommendations submitted by a 
Bureau of Indian Affairs range conservationist who is as-
sisted by full-time conservation officers employed by the 
Tribe. The recommendations are made in light of the con-
servation needs of the reservation, which are determined on 
the basis of annual game counts and surveys. Through the 
Bureau of Fish and Wildlife, the Secretary also determines 
the stocking of the reservation's waters based upon periodic 
surveys of the reservation. 
Numerous conflicts exist between State and tribal hunting 
regulations. 9 For instance, tribal seasons and bag limits for 
both hunting and fishing often do not coincide with those im-
posed by the State. The Tribe permits a hunter to kill both 
a buck and a doe; the State permits only buck to be killed. 
Unlike the State, the Tribe permits a person to purchase an 
elk license in two consecutive years. Moreover, since 1977, 
the Tribe's ordinances have specified that State hunting and 
fishing licenses are not required for Indians or non-Indians 
who hunt or fish on the reservation. 10 The New Mexico De-
partment of Game and Fish has enforced the State's regula-
tions by arresting non-Indian hunters for illegal possession of 
game killed on the reservation in accordance with tribal ordi-
nances but not in accordance with State hunting regulations. 
In 1977 the Tribe filed suit against the State and the Direc-
tor of its Fish and Game Department in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Mexico, seeking to pre-
vent the State from regulating on-reservation hunting or 
9 These conflicts have persisted despite the parties' stipulation that the 
New Mexico State Game Commission has attempted to "accomodate the 
preferences of the Mescalero Apache Tribe and other Indian tribes." Ap-
pendix to Brief in Opposition 25a. 
10 Prior to 1977 the Tribe consented to the application to the reservation 
of the State's hunting and fishing regulations. 
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fishing by members or nonmembers. On August 2, 1978, the 
District Court ruled in favor of the Tribe and granted de-
claratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the 
State's hunting and fishing laws against any person for hunt-
ing and fishing activities conducted on the reservation. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed. 630 F. 2d 724 (1980). Following New Mexico's pe-
tition for a writ of certiorari, this Court vacated the Tenth 
Circuit's judgment, 450 U. S. 1036 (1981), and remanded the 
case for reconsideration in light of Montana v. United States, 
450 U. S. 544 (1981). On remand, the Court of Appeals ad-
hered to its earlier decision. 677 F. 2d 55 (1982). We 
granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1982), and we now 
affirm. 
II 
New Mexico concedes that on the reservation the Tribe ex-
ercises exclusive jurisdiction over hunting and fishing by 
members of the Tribe and may also regulate the hunting and 
fishing by nonmembers. 11 New Mexico contends, however, 
that it may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over nonmem-
bers and that therefore its regulations governing hunting and 
fishing throughout the State should also apply to hunting and 
fishing by nonmembers on the reservation. Although New 
Mexico does not claim that it can require the Tribe to permit 
nonmembers to hunt and fish on the reservation, it claims 
that, once the Tribe chooses to permit hunting and fishing by 
nonmembers, such hunting and fishing is subject to any 
State-imposed conditions. Under this view the State would 
be free to impose conditions more restrictive than the Tribe's 
own regulations, including an outright prohibition. The 
question in this case is whether the State may so restrict the 
Tribe's exercise of its authority. 
Our decision in Montana v. United States, supra, does not 
resolve this question. Unlike this case, Montana concerned 
11 Brief for Petitioner 7, 12, 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. 
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lands located within the reservation but not owned by the 
Tribe or its members. We held that the Crow Tribe could 
not as a general matter regulate hunting and fishing on those 
lands. 450 U. S., at 557-567. 12 But as to "lands belonging 
to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the 
Tribe," we "readily agree[d]" that a Tribe may "prohibit non-
members from hunting or fishing . . . [or] condition their 
entry by charging a fee or establish bag and creel limits." 
Id., at 557. We had no occasion to decide whether a Tribe 
may only exercise this authority in a manner permitted by a 
State. 
On numerous occasions this Court has considered the ques-
tion whether a State may assert authority over a reservation. 
The decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561 (1832), 
reflected the view that Indian tribes were wholly distinct na-
tions within whose boundaries "the laws of [a State] can have 
no force." We long ago departed from the "conceptual clar-
ity of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view in Worcester," Mes-
calero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148 (1973), and 
have acknowledged certain limitations on tribal sovereignty. 
For instance, we have held that Indian tribes have been im-
plicitly divested of their sovereignty in certain respects by 
virtue of their dependent status, 13 that under certain circum-
stances a State may validly assert authority over the activi-
12 Even so, the Court acknowledged that "Indian tribes retain inherent 
sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands." 450 U. S., at 
565. The Court stressed that in Montana the pleadings "did not allege 
that non-Indian hunting and fishing on [non-Indian] reservation lands [had] 
impaired [the Tribe's reserved hunting and fishing privileges]," id., at 558 
n. 6, or "that non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee lands imperil the sub-
sistence or welfare of the Tribe," id., at 566, and that the existing record 
failed to suggested "that such non-Indian hunting and fishing ... threaten 
the Tribe's political or economic security." Ibid . 
13 See, e. g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 
667~68 (1974); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191 (1978). 
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ties of nonmembers on a reservation, 14 and that in exceptional 
circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the on-
reservation activities of tribal members. 15 
Nevertheless, in demarcating the respective spheres of 
State and tribal authority over Indian reservations, we have 
continued to stress that "Indian tribes are unique aggrega-
tions possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their 
members and their territory," White Mountain Apache Tribe 
v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 142 (1980), quoting United States 
v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975). Because of their sov-
ereign status, tribes and their reservation lands are insulated 
by an "historic immunity from state and local control," Mes-
calero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 152 (1973), and 
tribes retain any aspect of their historical sovereignty not 
"inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National 
Government." Washington v. Confederated Tribes, supra, 
at 153. 
The sovereignty retained by tribes includes "the power of 
regulating their internal and social relations," United States 
v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 381-382 (1886), cited in United 
States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 322 (1978). A tribe's 
power to presribe the conduct of tribal members has never 
been doubted, and our cases establish that a State may not 
assert its authority over the activities of members on a res-
14 See, e. g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); 
Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976). 
15 See Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 433 U.S. 165 (1977). 
Puyallup upheld the State of Washington's authority to regulate on-res-
ervation fishing by tribal members. Like Montana v. United States, 
supra, the decision in Puyallup rested in part on the fact that the dispute 
centered on lands which, although located within the reservation bound-
aries, no longer belonged to the tribe; all but 22 of the 18,000 acres had 
been alienated in fee simple. The Court also relied on a provision of the 
Indian treaty which qualified the Indians' fishing rights by requiring that 
they be exercised "in common with all citizens of the Territory," id., 175, 
and on the State's interest in conserving a scarce, common resource. 
Id., at 174, 17&-177. 
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ervation in the absence of express tribal consent or congres-
sional grant. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382, 
388-389 (1976) (per curiam); McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 171 (1973); Mescalero Apache 
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148 (1973). See also Williams 
v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 222 (1959). 
A tribe's power to exclude nonmembers entirely or to con-
dition their presence on the reservation is equally well 
established. See, e. g., Montana v. United States, supra; 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130 (1982). 
Whether a State may also assert its authority over the on-
reservation activities of nonmembers raises "[m]ore difficult 
questions," Bracker, supra, at 144. While under some cir-
cumstances a State may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over 
non-Indians acting on tribal reservations, see, e. g., Wash-
ington v. Confederated Tribes, supra; Moe v. Salish & Koote-
nai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976), such authority may be as-
serted only if not preempted by the operation of federal law. 
See, e. g., Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra; White Moun-
tain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, supra; Central Machinery Co. 
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U. S. 160 (1980); Williams v. 
Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ari-
zona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965); Fisher v. District 
Court, supra; Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 
u. s. 423 (1971). 
In Bracker we reviewed our prior decisions concerning 
tribal and State authority over Indian reservations and 
extracted certain principles governing the determination 
whether federal law preempts the assertion of State author-
ity over nonmembers on a reservation. We stated that that 
determination does not depend "on mechanical or absolute 
conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but calls for a par-
ticularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and 
tribal interests at stake." 448 U. S., at 145. 
We also emphasized the special sense in which the doctrine 
of preemption is applied in this context. See id., at 143-144; 
Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra,-- U. S., at--. Al-
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though a State will certainly be without jurisdiction if its au-
thority is preempted under familiar principles of preemption, 
we cautioned that our prior cases did not limit preemption of 
State laws affecting Indian tribes to only those circum-
stances. "The unique historical origins of tribal sover-
eignty" and the federal commitment to tribal self-sufficiency 
and self-determination make it "treacherous to import . . . 
notions of preemption that are properly applied to other con-
texts." Bracker, supra, at 143. See also Ramah Navajo 
School Bd., supra, at --. By resting preemption analysis 
principally on a consideration of the nature of the competing 
interests at stake, our cases have rejected a narrow focus on 
congressional intent to preempt State law as the sole touch-
stone. They have also rejected the proposition that preemp-
tion requires "an express congressional statement to that ef-
fect." Bracker, supra, at 144 (footnote omitted). State 
jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it 
interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests 
reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake 
are sufficient to justify the assertion of State authority. 
Bracker, supra, at 145. See also Ramah Navajo School 
Bd., supra, at--, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 
52, 67 (1941). 16 
Certain broad considerations guide our assessment of the 
federal and tribal interests. The traditional notions of In-
dian sovereignty provide a crucial "backdrop," Bracker, 
supra, at 143, citing McClanahan, supra, at 172, against 
which any assertion of State authority must be assessed. 
'
6 The exercise of State authority may also be barred by an independent 
barrier-inherent tribal sovereignty-if it "unlawfully infringe[s] 'on the 
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S., at 142, quoting Wil-
liams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959). See also Washington v. Yakima 
Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 502 (1979); Fisher v. District Court, 424 
U. S. 382 (1976) (per curiam); Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 
U. S. 423 (1971)." 448 U. S., at 142-143. 
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Moreover, both the tribes and the Federal Government are 
firmly committed to the goal of promoting tribal self-govern-
ment, a goal embodied in numerous federal statutes. 17 We 
have stressed that Congress' objective of furthering tribal 
self-government encompasses far more than encouraging 
tribal management of disputes between members, but in- ___ L.·.-~ 
eludes Congress' overriding goal of encouraging "tribal self- ( 4. c;, rr~ ft 
sufficiency and economic development." Bracker, supra, at ·W\... ·~ ~ 
143 (footnote omitted). In part as a necessary implication of . · ~ ·. 
this broad federal commitment, we have held that tribes have 
the power to manage the use of its territory and resources by ~{a ~ (_~ 
both members and nonmembers, 18 Merrion, supra, at 137; ~ ~
Bracker, supra, at 151; Montana v. United States, supra; 28 o\.l'f.h . ,r/1.:h/\ " 
U. 8. C. § 1162(b); 25 U. 8. C. §§ 1321(b), 1322(b); 18 ~ ~ ~- I 
17 For example, the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et 
seq., states: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress ... to help 
develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and human, to a point 
where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the utilization and 
management of their own resources and where they will enjoy a standard 
of living from their own productive efforts comparable to that enjoyed by 
non-Indians in neighboring communities." § 1451. Similar policies under-
lie the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 
U. S. C. § 450 et seq., as well as the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 
U.S. C. §461 et seq., pursuant to which the Mescalero Apache Tribe 
adopted its Constitution. The "intent and purpose of the Reorganization 
Act was 'to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to give him a chance 
to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternal-
ism."' Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S., at 152, quoting H. R. 
Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934). The Indian Civil Rights Act 
of 1968, 25 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq., likewise reflects Congress' intent "to 
promote the well-established federal 'policy of furthering Indian self-
government."' Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 62 (1978), 
quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974). 
'
8 Our cases have recognized that tribal sovereignty contains a "signifi-
cant geographical component." Bracker, supra, at 151. Thus the off-
reservation activities of Indians are generally subject to the prescriptions 
of a "nondiscriminatory state law" in the absence of "express federal law to 
the contrary." Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S., at 148-149. 
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U. S. C. § 1165, to undertake and regulate economic activity q__ ~~' 
within the reservation, Merrion, supra, at 137, and to defray • 
the cost of governmental services by levying taxes. Ibid. 
Thus, when a tribe undertakes an enterprise under the au-
thority i federallaw, an assertion of State authority is pre-
empted fit threatens to interfere with the successful accom-
plishmen of the federal purpose. See generally Bracker, 
supra, at 143 (footnote omitted), Ramah Navajo School Bd., 
supra, at--, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 
(1941) (State authority precluded when it "stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress"). 
Our prior decisions also guides our assessment of the state 
interest asserted to justify State jurisdiction over a reserva-
tion. The exercise of State authority which imposes addi-
tional burdens on a tribal enterprise must ordinarily be justi-
fied by functions or services performed by the State in 
connection with the on-reservation activity. Ramah Navajo 
School Bd., supra, at-- and note 7; Bracker, supra, at 
148-149; Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 
448 U. S. 160, 174 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring). Thus a 
State seeking to impose a tax on a transaction between a 
Tribe and nonmembers must point to more than its general 
interest in raising revenues. See, e. g., Warren Trading 
Post Co., supra; Bracker, supra; Ramah Navajo School Bd., D~MIJSI ~ 
supra. A State's regulatory interest will be particularly 
substantial if the State can point to off-reservation effects 
that necessitate State intervention. Cf. Puyallup Tribe v. 
Washington Game Dept. , supra. 
III 
With these principles in mind, we turn to New Mexico's 
claim that it may superimpose its own hunting and fishing 
regulations on the Mescalero Apache Tribe's regulatory 
scheme. 
A 
It is beyond doubt that the Mescalero Apache Tribe law-
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fully exercises substantial control over the lands and re-
sources of its reservation, including its wildlife. As noted 
above, supra, at 6--7, and as conceded by New Mexico/9 the 
sovereignty retained by the Tribe under the Treaty of 1852 
includes its right to regulate the use of its resources by mem-
bers as well as non-members. In Montana v. United States, 
supra, we specifically recognized that tribes in general retain 
this authority. 
Moreover, this aspect of tribal sovereignty has been ex-
pressly confirmed by numerous federal statutes. 20 Pub. L. 
280 specifically confirms the power of tribes to regulate on-
reservation hunting and fishing. 67 Stat. 588, 25 U. S. C. 
§ 1321(b); 18 U. S. C. § 1162(b). 21 This authority is afforded 
the protection of the federal criminal law by 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1165, which makes it a violation of federal law to enter In-
19 New Mexico concedes that the Tribe originally relied on wildlife for 
subsistence, that tribal members freely took fish and game in ancestral 
territory, and that the Treaty of July 1, 1852, 10 Stat. 979, between the 
Tribe and the United States confirmed the Tribe's rights regarding hunt-
ing and fishing on the small portion of the aboriginal Mescalero domain that 
was eventually set apart as the Tribe's reservation. Brief, at 12. See 
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U. S. 404 (1968); Mon-
tana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, 55~59 (1981). See also United 
States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371, 381 (1905) (recognizing that hunting and 
fishing "were not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than 
the atmosphere they breathed"). 
ro The Tribe's authority was also confirmed more generally by the Indian 
Reorganization Act, 25 U. S. C. § 476, which reaffirms "all powers vested 
in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law." 
21 The provision of Pub. L. 280 granting States criminal jurisdiction over 
Indian reservations under certain conditions provides that States were not 
thereby authorized to 
"deprive any Indian of any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, 
privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or stat-
ute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing or 
regulation thereof." 18 U. S. C. § 1162(b); 25 U. S. C. § 1321(b) (emphasis 
added). 
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dian land to hunt, trap or fish without the consent of the 
tribe. See Montana v. United States, 450 U. S., at 562 n. 
11. The 1981 amendments to the Lacey Act, 16 U. S. C. 
§ 3371 et seq., further accord tribal hunting and fishing regu-
lations the force of federal law by making it a federal offense 
"to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or pur-
chase any fish or wildlife . . . taken or possessed in violation 
of any ... Indian tribal law." § 3372(a)(1). 22 
B 
Several considerations strongly support the Court of Ap-
peals' conclusion that the Tribe's authority to regulate hunt-
ing and fishing preempts State jurisdiction. It is important 
to emphasize that concurrent jurisdiction would effectively 
nullify the Tribe's authority to control hunting and fishing on 
the reservation. Concurrent jurisdiction would empower 
New Mexico wholly to supplant tribal regulations. The 
State would be able to dictate the terms on which nonmem-
bers are permitted to utilize the reservation's resources. 
The Tribe would thus exercise its authority over the reserva-
tion only at the sufferance of the State. The tribal authority 
to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers, which has 
been repeatedly confirmed by federal treaties and laws and 
which we explicitly recognized in Montana v. United States, 
supra, would have a rather hollow ring if tribal authority 
amounted to no more than this. 
Furthermore, the exercise of concurrent State jurisdiction 
in this case would completely "disturb and disarrange", War-
ren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 
685, 691 (1965), the comprehensive scheme of federal and 
tribal management established pursuant to federal law. As 
described above, supra, at 2-3, federal law requires the Sec-
22 Sections 3375(a) and (b) authorize the Secretary to enter into agree-
ments with Indian tribes to enforce the provisions of the law by, inter alia, 
making arrests and serving process. 
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retary to review each of the Tribe's hunting and fishing ordi-
nances. Those ordinances are based on the recommenda-
tions made by a federal range conservationist employed by 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Moreover, the Bureau of 
Sport Fisheries and Wildlife stocks the reservation's waters 
based on its own determinations concerning the availability of 
fish, biological requirements, and the fishing pressure cre-
ated by on-reservation fishing. App. 71. 23 
Concurrent State jurisdiction would supplant this regula-
tory scheme with an inconsistent dual system: members 
would be governed by Tribal ordinances, while nonmembers 
would be regulated by general State hunting and fishing 
laws. This could severely hinder the ability of the Tribe to 
conduct a sound management program. Tribal ordinances 
reflect the specific needs of the reservation by establishing 
the optimal level of hunting and fishing that should occur, not 
simply a maximum level that should not be exceeded. State 
laws in contrast are based on considerations not necessarily 
relevant to, and possibly hostile to, the needs of the reserva-
tion. For instance, the ordinance permitting a hunter to kill 
a buck and a doe was designed to curb excessive growth of 
the deer population on the reservation. App. at 153-154. 
Enforcement of the State regulation permitting only buck to 
be killed would frustrate that objective. Similarly, by deter-
mining the Tribal hunting seasons, bag limits, and permit 
availability, the Tribe regulates the duration and intensity of 
hunting. These determinations take into account numerous 
factors, including the game capacity of the terrain, the range 
utilization of the game animals, and the availability of tribal 
personnel to monitor the hunts. Permitting the State to en-
force different restrictions simply because they have been de-
termined to be appropriate for the State as a whole would im-
pose on the Tribe the possibly insurmountable task of 
23 In addition, as noted earlier, supra, at 3-4, the Federal Government 
played a substantial role in the development of the Tribe's resources. 
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ensuring that the patchwork application of State and Tribal 
regulations remains consistent with sound management of 
the reservation's resources. 
Federal law commits to the Secretary and the Tribal Coun-
cil the responsibility to manage the reservation's resources. 
It is most unlikely that Congress would have authorized, and 
the Secretary would have established, financed, and partici-
pated in Tribal management if it were thought that New 
Mexico was free to nullify the entire arrangement. 24 Requir-
ing Tribal ordinances to yield whenever State law is more re-
strictive would seriously "undermine the Secretary's [and the 
Tribe's] ability to make the wide range of determinations 
committed to [their] authority." Bracker, supra, at 149. 
See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382, 390 (1976) (per 
curiam); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544 (1975). 25 
24 The Secretary assumed precisely the opposite is true-that State ju-
risdiction is preempted-when he approved a tribal ordina~ce which pro-
vided that nonmembers hunting and fishing on the reservation need not 
obtain State licenses. That assumption is also embodied in an agreement 
between the Tribe and the Department of Interior's Bureau of Sport Fish-
eries and Wildlife, see note 7, supra, which openly acknowledges that 
tribal regulations need not agree with State laws. The agreement pro-
vides that "{ i]nsofar as possible said regulations shall be in agreement 
with State regulations." (Emphasis added). 
20 Congress' intent to preempt State regulation of hunting and fishing on 
reservations is reinforced by Pub. L. 280. That law, which grants limited 
criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians reservations to States which 
meet certain requirements, contains a provision which expressly excludes 
authority over hunting and fishing. That provision provides that a State 
which has properly assumed jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280 is not thereby 
authorized to 
"deprive any Indian of any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, 
privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or stat-
ute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing or 
regulation thereof." 18 U. S. C. § 1162(b); 25 U. S. C. § 1321(b) (emphasis 
added). 
Pub. L. 280 evidences Congress' understanding that tribal regulation of 
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The assertion of concurrent jurisdiction by New Mexico not 
only would threaten to disrupt the federal and tribal regula-
tory scheme, but would also threaten Congress' overriding 
objective of encouraging tribal self-government and economic 
development. The Tribe has engaged in a concerted and 
sustained undertaking to develop and manage the reserva-
tion's wildlife and land resources specifically for the benefit of 
its members. The project generates funds for essential 
tribal services and provides employment for members who 
reside on the reservation. This case is thus far removed 
from those situations, such as on-reservation sales outlets 
which market to nonmembers goods not manufactured by the 
tribe or its members, in which the tribal contribution to an 
enterprise is de minimis. See Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes, 447 U. S. 134, 154-159 (1980). 26 The Tribal enter-
prise in this case clearly involves "value generated on the res-
ervation by activities involving the Trib[e]." /d., at 
156-157. The disruptive effect that would result from the 
assertion of concurrent jurisdiction by New Mexico would 
plainly "stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
hunting and fishing should generally be insulated from State interference, 
since "Congress would not have jealously protected" tribal exemption from 
conflicting State hunting and fishing laws "had it thought that the States 
had residual power to impose such [laws] in any event." McClanahan v. 
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 177 (1973). In McClanahan we con-
cluded that the Buck Act, 4 U. S. C. § 105 et seq., which contains a provi-
sion exempting Indians from a grant to the States of general authority to 
tax residents of federal areas, likewise provided evidence of Congress' in-
tent to exempt Indians from State taxes. Ibid. 
26 In Washington v. Confederated Tribes the Court held that the sales of 
tribal smokeshops which sold cigarettes to nonmembers were subject to 
the State sales and cigarette taxes. Id., at 154-159. The Court relied on 
the fact that the tribal smokeshops were not marketing "value generated 
on the reservation," id., at 15~157, but instead were seeking merely to 
market a "tax exemption to nonmembers who do not receive significant 
tribal services." Id., at 157. 
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full purposes and objectives of Congress," Ramah Navajo 
School Bd., supra, at--, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
u. s. 52, 67 (1941). 
c 
The State has failed to "identify any regulatory function or 
service . . . that would justify" the assertion of concurrent 
regulatory authority. Bracker, supra, at 148. The hunting 
and fishing permitted by the Tribe occur entirely on the res-
ervation. The fish and wildlife resources are either native to 
the reservation or were created by the joint efforts of the 
Tribe and the Federal Government. New Mexico does not 
contribute in any significant respect to the maintenance of 
these resources, and can point to no other "governmental 
functions it provides," Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at 
--, in connection with hunting and fishing on the reserva-
tion by nonmembers that would justify the assertion of its 
authority. 
The State also cannot point to any off-reservation effects 
that warrant State intervention. Some species of game 
never leave tribal lands, and the State points to no specific 
interest concerning those that occasionally do. Unlike 
Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., supra, this is 
not a case in which a Treaty expressly subiects a tribe's hunt-
ing and fishing rights to the common rights of nonmembers 
and in which a State's interest in conserving a scarce, com-
mon supply justifies State intervention. 433 U. S., at 17 4, 
175--177. The State concedes that the Tribe's management 
has not had an adverse impact on fish and wildlife outside the 
reservation." Appendix to Brief in Opposition 35a.-n 
-nwe reject the State's claim that the Tribe's ability to manage its wild-
life resources suffers from a lack of enforcement powers and that therefore 
concurrent jurisdiction is necessary to fill the void. The Tribe clearly can 
exclude or expel those who violate Tribal ordinances. Trespassers may be 
referred for prosecution under 18 U. S. C. § 1165. Furthermore, the 
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New Mexico contends that it will be deprived of the sale of 
state licenses to nonmembers who hunt and fish on the res-
ervation, as well as some federal matching funds calculated in 
part on the basis of the number of State licenses sold. 28 
However, the State expressly disavows any reliance on its 
taxing powers as the basis for concurrent jurisdiction. It de-
fends the application of its hunting and fishing laws, including 
the State's license requirement, solely as a proper exercise of 
its regulatory authority, Petitioner's Brief 18 n. 5, and the 
State's regulatory interests, as we have indicated, are insig-
nificant. Even if the State's licensing requirement were 
properly characterized and defended as an independent tax-
ing measure, the State's financial interests are insufficient to 
justify the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction. The loss of 
revenues to the State is likely to be insubstantial given the 
small numbers of persons who purchase tribal hunting li-
censes.29 Moreover, as already noted, supra, at 18,the 
State has pointed to no services it has performed in connec-
tion with hunting and fishing by nonmembers which justify 
imposing a tax in the form of a hunting and fishing li-
cense, Ramaha Navajo School Bd., supra, at--; Central 
Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U. S., at 174 
Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U. S. C. § 3371 et seq., make it a fed-
eral offense to violate any tribal law, provide for civil and criminal pen-
alties and authorizes forfeiture of fish or wildlife as well as vehicles or 
equipment used in the violation, §§ 3373, 3374, and provide that the Secre-
tary can grant authority to tribal personnel to enforce these provisions. 
§ 3375(a), (b). 
28 The State receives federal matching funds through the Pittman-
Robinson Act, 16 U. S. C. 669 (hunting), and the Dingle.Johnson Act, 16 
U. S. C. 777 (fishing) , which are allocated through a formula which consid-
ers the number of licenses sold and the number of acres in the State. 
29 In recent years the Tribe sold 10 antelope licenses compared to 3,500 
for the State, 50 elk licenses compared to 14,000 by the State, and 500 deer 
licenses compared to 100,000 for the State. 
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(POWELL, J., concurring), and its general desire to obtain 
revenues is simply inadequate to justify the assertion of con-
current jurisdiction in this case. See Bracker, supra, at 150; 
Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at --.30 
IV 
In this case the governing body of an Indian Tribe, work-
ing closely with the Federal Government and under the au-
thority of federal law, has exercised its lawful authority to 
develop and manage the reservation's resources for the bene-
fit of its members. The exercise of concurrent jurisdiction 
by the State would effectively nullify the Tribe's unques-
tioned authority to regulate the use of its resources by mem-
bers and nonmembers, interfere with the comprehensive 
tribal regulatory scheme, and threaten Congress' firm com-
mitment to the encouragement of tribal self-sufficiency and 
economic development. Given the strong interests favoring 
exclusive tribal jurisdiction and the absence of State interests 
which justify the assertion of concurrent authority, we con-
clude that the application of the State's hunting and fishing 
laws to the reservation is preempted. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
00 New Mexico concedes that it has expended no Dingle..J ohnson funds 
for projects within the reservation during the last six to eight years. Ap-
pendix to Br. in Opposition 17a-18a. It presented no evidence as to ex-
penditures of Pittman-Robinson funds within the reservation. 
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Ma~· 11, 1983 
Re: New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, No. 82-231 
Dear Thurgood, 
I am essentially in agreement with both the result and 
your approach in this case. 
As I mentioned to you in my earlier letter, I am having 
some difficulty with certain portions of your proposed 
opinion due to my hope that it can be compatible with my 
draft opinion in Rice v. Rehner. My specific problems are 
these: 
1. On page 8, in the first full paragraph, you quote 
Mescalero and Confederated Tribes for the proposition that 
Indians on reservations have been historically immune from 
all state control, and that they retain this immunity 
insofar as it is consistent with federal objectives. I 
think it would be more accurate to say that "Because of 
their sovereign status, tribes and their reservation lands 
have, in some circumstances, possessed 'historic immunity 
from state and local control,' •••• " This would avoid 
conveying the impression that Indians have enjoyed a 
tradition of immunity from state law in all areas. 
2. Also on page 8, in the second full paragraph going 
over to page 9, you state that "our cases establish that a 
State may not assert its authority over the activities of 
members on a reservation in the absence of express tribal 
consent or congressional grant." Again, I think that this 
statement would be more accurate if it were to read: "our 
cases establish that where there is a tradition of tribal 




3. On page 12, in the carryover paragraph, you state: 
"Thus, when a tribe undertakes an enterprise under the 
authority of federal law, an assertion of State authority is 
preempted to the extent that it 'threaten[s] the overriding 
federal objective' of promoting 'tribal self-sufficiency and 
economic development.'" I think the implication of this 
statement is too broad and contrary to the balancing 
structure for preemption analysis established in Bracker. 
The statement suggests that anytime state authority · 
threatens the federal policy in favor of Indian economic 
self-development, state regulation is preempted. To me this 
is contrary to the spirit of Bracker. The threat to a 
federal policy is only one factor to be considered. There 
is no preemption "to the extent" there is a threat, as the 
opinion suggests. In short, some financial burdens imposed 
by state regulation may be perfectly permissible depending 
on the outcome of balancing federal and tribal interests 
against state interests. I suggest that the sentence be 
changed to read: "Thus, when a tribe undertakes an 
enterprise under the authority of federal law, an assertion 
of State authority must be weighed against any threat to an 
"overriding federal objective" of promoting "tribal self-
sufficiency." 
4. Also on page 12, in the first full paragraph, you 
suggest that when a State seeks to impose additional burdens 
on a tribal enterprise, it must ordinarily justify those 
burdens by performance of services. I think that it would 
be appropriate to mention in this context our decisions in 
Confederated Tribes and Moe, which held that the State may 
tax certain on-reservation transactions, and may impose 
burdens on Indian businesses to aid in collecting and 
enforcing that tax. 
5. Also on page 12, in the first full paragraph, you 
state: "A State seeking not merely to tax but to regulate a 
tribal activity is under a greater burden to advance a 
significant State interest, since duplicative and 
potentially conflicting regulation is generally more 
disruptive than double taxation." As far as I know, we have 
never required that States advance a "significant interest" 
in order to impose a regulation when non-members are 
involved, · or where there is no tradition of tribal immunity. 
Perhaps this sentence could be changed to read: "When a 
State seeks to regulate traditionally immune transactions 
between tribal members pn a reservation, the State must have 





6. On page 19, you suggest that even if the State 
sought to characterize the licensing requirement as a tax, 
"the State's financial interests are insufficient to justify 
the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction." As you 
acknowledge, the State defends the licensing requirement 
only as a proper exercise of its regulatory power. I see no 
reason to discuss what wou~d happen if the State 
characterized the requirement here as a proper tax measure. 
Moreover, I would prefer to avoid any suggestion that the 
tribes have a sovereign interest in sales of "hunting 
packages" to non-members of the tribe for purposes of state 
taxation of those "packages." That would seem to create a 
tension with our decisions in Confederated Tribes and Moe. 
I think none of the suggested changes would alter your 
essential approach and if you could accommodate these 
concerns, I would be happy to join your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
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